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Mathematics in Spengler and in other grand historical syntheses
Mathematics plays a major role in Der Untergang des Abendlandes – in
outspoken contrast to two other grand and famous syntheses from the same
epoch. In total, H. G. Wells’ slightly more extensive Outline of History from [1920]
thus offers no more than 12 references to the topic, all of them with any depth:
– In Confucius’ China, the literary class was taught mathematics as one of the
“Six Accomplishments” (p. 132);
– sound mathematical work was done in Alexandria (p. 197);
– Arabic mathematics built on that of the Greek (p. 336),
– and al-Khwārizmı̄ was a mathematician (p. 336);
– the Mongol court received Persian and Indian astronomers and mathe-
maticians (p. 374);
– mathematics and other sciences have been applied in war (p. 448);
– Napoleon had been an industrious student of mathematics as well as history
(p. 487);
– James Watt was a mathematical instrument maker (p. 506);
– the mathematical level of English post-Reformation universities was poor
(p. 525),
– but mathematics was compulsory at Oxford (p. 526);
– in post-1871 Germany, mathematics teaching might be interrupted by “long
passages of royalist patriotic rant” (p. 551);
– and finally, without the word “mathematics”, our “modern numerals are
Arabic; our arithmetic and algebra are essentially Semitic sciences” (p. 108).
Arnold Toynbee’s even more monumental Study of History (12 volumes) from
[1934] onward is not very different on this account. He, no less than Wells,
belongs to
die Idealisten und Ideologen, die Nachzügler des humanistischen Klassizismus der
Goethezeit, welche technische Dinge und Wirtschaftsfragen überhaupt als außerhalb
und unterhalb der Kultur stehend verachteten.1
Toynbee’s volume 12 (“Reconsiderations”) contains a number of passages
explaining that the study of history cannot be formulated as abstract mathematics,
1 [Spengler 1931: 2] – “the belated stragglers of the humanistic Classicism of Goethe’s
age, who regarded things technical and matters economic as standing outside, or rather




and a statement that the author’s purely classical education and ensuing
ignorance of mathematics has not been fatal to the inquiry. In volume 3 (“The
Growth of Civilizations”), mathematics turns up in quotations from Spengler
and Bergson on pp. 185, 381 and 388–89, and it is claimed that “Our western
world inherited [...] the Greek science of mathematics [...]” without any “break
of continuity” in spite of the intervening social cataclysm. Vol. 7 (“Universal
churches”) believes on pp. 305–07 that Sumerian counting was duodecimal, and
that this Sumerian system was conserved in later metrologies until being
supplanted by the less rational French metric system (except in the British
division of the weight pound in 12 ounces and the shilling in 12 pence) – no
source being offered for this fantasy. Finally, in connection with the analysis of
civilizations and historical process, volume 9 (“Contacts between Civilizations
in Time – Law and Freedom in History – The Prospects of the Western
Civilization”) speaks on pp. 697–704 about mathematics and its relations to the
social milieu, namely in polemics with Spengler, claiming (p. 700) that
It would, indeed, be as fantastic to suggest that Geometry and the Calculus are
diverse, alternative, and incompatible systems of Mathematics as it would be
reasonable to say that these are different aspects of one identical object of mathemat-
ical study that can properly be called “Number-in-Itself”,
admitting only that
the several provinces of this realm of Mathematical Science have been opened up
at different times and places by divers members of a single mathematical fraternity
whose choices of their particular fields of mathematical research have been always
influenced, and sometimes virtually determined, by a mental penchant or habitus
imparted to the individual mathematician by his social milieu
but maintaining (p. 701) with no argument beyond Gibbon’s authority that, as
the result of a
Collective Human Intellect’s cumulative achievement ... The Mathematics are
distinguished by a peculiar privilege that, in the course of ages, they may always
advance and can never recede
without making it clear whether this means that results once obtained remain
valid in something like Popper’s Third World or that they can never be forgotten,
and thinking that
we have now disposed of Spengler’s contention that Mathematics are subject to the
same law of social relativity as social human affairs.
Seen from this perspective (and not only), Spengler’s emphatic declarations do
seem provocative. Spengler certainly goes more into historical detail than
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Toynbee, but there are still immense gaps between exemplifying details and the
conclusions derived from them, and more gaps between these conclusions and
the ultimate generalizations.
First of all, there is the passage which scandalizes Toynbee (p. 81):2
Eine Zahl an sich gibt es nicht und kann es nicht geben. Es gibt mehrere Zahlen-
welten, weil es mehrere Kulturen gibt. Wir finden einen indischen, arabischen,
antiken, abendländischen Typus des mathematischen Denkens und damit Typus einer
Zahl, jeder von Grund aus etwas Eignes und Einziges, jeder Ausdruck eines andern
Weltgefühls, jeder Symbol von einer auch wissenschaftlich genau begrenzten
Gültigkeit, Prinzip einer Ordnung des Gewordnen, in der sich das tiefste Wesen einer
einzigen und keiner andern Seele spiegelt, derjenigen, welche Mittelpunkt gerade
dieser und keiner andern Kultur ist. Es gibt demnach mehr als eine Mathematik.3
Obviously, this has nothing directly to do with mathematical results that may
be cumulative or at least conserved once they are reached – at most but not
necessarily it provides a framework for these. This is also clear on p. 79:
Gotische Dome und dorische Tempel sind steingewordne Mathematik. Gewiß hat
erst Pythagoras die antike Zahl als das Prinzip einer Weltordnung greifbarer Dinge,
als Maß oder Größe, wissenschaftlich erfaßt,4
an obvious reference to the fundamental role played by limit and proportion
in Greek philosophy and ideology of mathematics and to the likely links between
this conception of mathematics and the canonic proportions of sculpture (p.88).
Nor does theory-building constitute the substance of Spengler’s notion of
mathematics (p. 80):
2 Since almost all of my quotations from Der Untergang ... come from volume I (revised
edition, [Spengler 1923]), these will for simplicity just be referred to by page. All
translations are taken from that of Atkinson [Spengler 1927], to which the page numbers
for translations refer; my corrections of obvious mistakes and omissions in Atkinson’s
translation stand in 〈 〉.
3 “There is not and cannot be, number as such. There are several number-worlds as there
are several Cultures. We find an Indian, an Arabian, a Classical, a Western type of
mathematical thought and, corresponding with each, a type of number – each type
fundamentally peculiar and unique, an expression of a specific world-feeling, a symbol
having a specific validity which is even capable of scientific definition, a principle of
ordering the Become which reflects the central essence of one and only one soul, viz.,
the soul of that particular Culture. Consequently, there are more mathematics than one”
(p. 59).
4 “Gothic cathedrals and Doric temples are mathematics in stone. Doubtless Pythagoras
was the first in the Classical Culture to conceive number scientifically as the principle
of a world-order of comprehensible things” (p. 58).
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Eine hohe mathematische Begabung kann auch ohne jede Wissenschaft technisch
produktiv sein und in dieser Form zum vollen Bewußtsein ihrer selbst gelangen. [...]
Die Eingebornen Australiens, deren Geist durchaus der Stufe des Urmenschen
angehört, besitzen einen mathematischen Instinkt oder, was dasselbe ist, ein noch
nicht durch Worte und Zeichen mitteilbar gewordenes Denken in Zahlen, das in bezug
auf die Interpretation reiner Räumlichkeit das griechische bei weitem übertrifft. Sie
haben als Waffe den Bumerang erfunden, dessen Wirkung auf eine gefühlsmäßige
Vertrautheit mit Zahlenarten schließen läßt, die wir der höheren geometrischen
Analysis zuweisen würden. Sie besitzen dementsprechend [...] ein äußerst komplizier-
tes Zeremoniell und eine so feine sprachliche Abstufung der Verwandtschaftsgrade,
wie sie nirgends, selbst in hohen Kulturen nicht wieder beobachtet worden ist.5
Via a double contrast to Pericles’s Greece this unexplicit mathematical thought
is then presented as a parallel to the mixture of explicit and implicit supposed
mathematical thought of the Baroque,
das neben der Analysis des Raumes den Hof des Sonnenkönigs und ein auf
dynastischen Verwandschaften beruhendes Staatensystem entstehen sah.6
Evidently, this has nothing to do with Gibbon’s “Collective Human Intellect’s
cumulative achievement”. Objections to “Spengler’s contention” can certainly
be formulated, also beyond his very delimitation of the concept of mathematics –
but Toynbee and those whom he represents miss them completely.
In any case – this is liable to provoke the interest of historians of mathematics,
as well as such mathematicians who doubt the Anglican whiggism of a Toynbee –
Spengler offers one of the few global historical syntheses where mathematics
plays a central role.
5 “A high mathematical endowment may, without any mathematical science whatsoever,
come to fruition and full selfknowledge in technical spheres. [... ] The Australian natives,
who rank intellectually as thorough primitives, possess a mathematical instinct (or, what
comes to the same thing, a power of thinking in numbers which is not yet communicable
by signs or words) that as regards the interpretation of pure space is far superior to that
of the Greeks. Their discovery of the boomerang can only be attributed to their having
a sure feeling for numbers of a class that we should refer to the higher geometry.
Accordingly [...] they possess an extraordinarily complicated ceremonial and, for
expressing degrees of affinity, such fine shades of language as not even the higher Cultures
themselves can show” (p. 58).
6 “presents us with a mathematic of spatial analysis, a court of Versailles and a state system
resting on dynastic relations” (p. 58). Cf. also p. 8, “Wer weiß es, daß zwischen der
Differentialrechnung und dem dynastischen Staatsprinzip der Zeit Ludwigs XIV. [...] ein
tiefer Zusammenhang der Form besteht?“ (“Who [...] realizes that between the Differential
Calculus and the dynastic principle of politics in the age of Louis XIV [...] there are deep
uniformities?” (p. 7).
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No wonder, therefore, that Spengler’s views of mathematics finds explicit
echoes as well as parallels among sociologists of mathematical knowledge7 as
well as students of ethnomathematics and the history of mathematics – many
of whom will however have been quite unaware of the parallel.
But let us return to some of the objections. Workers on ethnomathematics
certainly agree with Spengler’s inclusion of aboriginal and similar kinship
structures and appurtenant marriage regulations in mathematics – cf. for instance
[Ascher & Ascher 1986: 135–139]; but they will not include practices which do
not allow us to distinguish underlying formal structures, and nothing in what
Spengler says about boomerangs (whether their production or use) suggests that.
For Spengler, instead, mathematical law is “Das Mittel, tote Formen zu erkennen”
(p. 4 – “the means whereby to identify dead forms”, p. 4) – where no “formaliza-
tion” should be read into Formen, and tot/“dead” is everything that has not to
be understood as Welt als Geschichte/“world-as-history” (p. 6, trans. p. 5) – the
two realms being thus described by mathematical number and chronological number,
respectively (p. 7).8
If this is taken to the letter, a historian of mathematics might skip Spengler’s
whole endeavour wholesale, in the way Aristotle skips Plato’s “ideal numbers”,
to which “no mathematical theorem applies [...], unless one tries to interfere with
the principles of mathematics and invent particular theories of one’s own”
(Metaphysics Ν, 1090b27–35, [trans. Tredennick 1933: II, 281]). It would hardly
be justified, however, to take everything to the letter in a work which according
to its preface (p. vii) is
einen ersten Versuch [...], mit allen Fehlern eines solchen behaftet, unvollständig und
sicherlich nicht ohne inneren Widerspruch.9
So, let us turn elsewhere. The image of one mathematics above historical
circumstance, progressing toward one inescapable goal, smacks of what is
commonly thought of as “Platonism” (or, in the terminology of recent
7 Thus [Restivo 1983], cf. [Høyrup [1984].
8 Those who want to may see Spengler’s delimitation of mathematics as prophetical –
actually, the intervening century has seen virtually the whole domain of “dead forms”
being subjected to mathematization, and even much of that living world which according
to Goethe, Spengler and Habermas ought not to be treated thus (cf. also the discussion
of Habermas in [Barnes 1977: 13–19], which mutatis mutandis can also equally well applied
to Spengler if not to Goethe’s inspired utterances).
9 “a first attempt, loaded with all the customary faults, incomplete and 〈certainly〉 not
without 〈internal contradictions〉” (p. xiii).
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historiographic polemics, “essentialism”), and after another century’s research
in the history of mathematics better counterarguments can certainly be advanced
today than those advanced by Spengler – touching also at results and theories.
On the other hand, Spengler’s view of cultures with their inherent culminbation
as “civilization” also strongly suggest essentialism (this time however Romanti-
cist). Thus (p. 42),
jede Kultur hat ihre eigne Zivilisation. [...] Die Zivilisation ist das unausweichliche
Schicksal einer Kultur. Hier ist der Gipfel erreicht, von dem aus die letzten und
schwersten Fragen der historischen Morphologie lösbar werden. Zivilisationen sind
die äußersten und künstlichsten Zustände, deren eine höhere Art von Menschen fähig
ist. Sie sind ein Abschluß,10
and p. 29,
Jede Kultur hat ihre neuen Möglichkeiten des Ausdrucks, die erscheinen, reifen,
verwelken und nie wiederkehren. Es gibt viele, im tiefsten Wesen völlig voneinander
verschiedene Plastiken, Malereien, Mathematiken, Physiken, jede von begrenzter
Lebensdauer, jede in sich selbst geschlossen, wie jede Pflanzenart ihre eignen Blüten
und Früchte, ihren eignen Typus von Wachstum und Niedergang hat. [...] Sie gehören,
wie Pflanzen und Tiere, der lebendigen Natur Goethes, nicht der toten Natur Newtons
an.11
Whether essentialism (Romanticist or otherwise) is objectionable must depend
on arguments, and that is what I give afterwards in a specific example. But even
a priori, essentialism can be seen to bar certain questions – in Spengler’s case
such questions as concern development of general characteristics other than the
ones prescribed by the fate of the culture in question,12 or those pertaining to
10 “every Culture has its own Civilization. [...] The Civilization is the inevitable destiny
of the Culture, and 〈here the high point is reached〉 from which the deepest and gravest
problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the
〈extreme and most〉 artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable.
They are a 〈termination〉” (p. 31).
11 “Each Culture has its own new possibilities of self-expression which arise, ripen, decay,
and never return. There is not one sculpture, one painting, on mathematics, one physics,
but many, each in its deepest essence different from the others, each limited in duration
and self-contained, just as each species of plant has its peculiar blossom or fruit, its special
type of growth and decline. [...] They belong, like the plants and the animals, to the living
Nature of Goethe, and not to the dead Nature of Newton” (p. 21).
12 Cf. the closing words of vol. II (p. 635):
Wir haben nicht die Freiheit, dies oder jenes zu erreichen, aber die, das Notwendige
zu tun oder nichts. Und eine Aufgabe, welche die Notwendigkeit der Geschichte
gestellt hat, wird gelöst, mit dem einzelnen oder gegen ihn.
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causal explanation (cf. Chapter II.ii, “Schicksalsidee und Kausalitätsprinzip”/“The
destiny-idea and the causality principle”, pp. 154ff, translation p. 115ff) – be it
the Humean insipid version, be it dynamic structural-functional causation.13
Mesopotamia – a case study
Spengler refers quite often to Babylonian mathematics; all he could know
about, however, was the mathematics of Seleucid astronomy (contemporary with
Euclid or later), which he was informed about through Carl Bezold’s Astronomie,
Himmelsschau und Astrallehre bei den Babyloniern (which, apart from knowing about
no mathematics antedating Seleucid epoch deals with nothing but this very
particular aspect of mathematics). Almost all pertinent sources have indeed been
published after the appearance of Der Untergang. The emergence and develop-
ment of Mesopotamian mathematics may thus serve as that application of a
theory to a new realm which philosophers of science often see as a decisive test,
Ducunt fata volentem, nolentem trahunt.
In translation (p. II, 507),
We have not the freedom to reach to this or to that, but the freedom to do the
necessary or to do nothing. And a task that historic necessity has set will be
accomplished with the individual or against him.
Ducunt Fata volentem, nolentem trahunt.
One may think of Sartre’s Les mouches: Oreste returns to Argos, in a postmodern search
for his roots. But fate is waiting for him, and eventually he accepts it as “bien à moi”.
Electre has waited for revenge of her father with burning soul, but in the end she betrays –
yet things happen as they are bound to (or as the myth prescribes).
13 Similarly, Michel Foucault’s notions of successive épistémès forbids questions relating,
for instance, Linné and Darwin [1966: 14]:
Si l’histoire naturelle de Tournefort, de Linné et de Buffon a rapport à autre chose
qu’à elle-même, ce n’est pas à la biologie, à l’anatomie comparée de Cuvier ou à
l’évolutionnisme de Darwin, c’est à la grammaire générale de Bauzée, c’est à l’analyse
de la monnaie et de la richesse telle qu’on la trouve chez Law, chez Véron de
Fortbonnais ou chez Turgot
or, in translation [Foucault 1971: xxii–xxiii]:
If the natural history of Tournefort, Linnaeus, and Button can be related to anything
at all other than itself, it is not to biology, to Cuvier’s comparative anatomy, or to
Darwin’s theory of evolution, but to Bauzee’s general grammar, to the analysis of
money and wealth as found in the works of Law, or Veron de Fortbonnais, or Turgot.
Obviously, the guru – recently ranked as next to compulsory “theory” in the professional
upbringing of US historians of science [Nappi 2013: 106] – invites the same objections
as Spengler; he is likely to have read less of the material he speaks about (at least Linné
and Darwin) than Spengler.
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and which may allow us to discern what has to be retained, what has to be
reinterpreted, and what has to be rejected in Spengler’s morphology of mathemat-
ical culture.
Mesopotamian culture, as Spengler would define it, was born in Uruk in
southern Iraq, at the onset of the “Uruk IV” phase – perhaps 3200 BCE, perhaps
already 3400 BCE (in the absence of wood, neither carbon 14 dating nor
dendrochronology allow us to know precisely, nor does the precise dating
matter14). What was born was a statal social organization centred around the
great temples, legitimized by a transformation of an age-old redistribution
practice into a system of taxation (or tribute) coupled to distribution of land and
food rations – taxation as well as distribution being precisely accounted for. The
birth of the state was thus not only conditioned by the creation of writing and
book-keeping – these are indeed inseparable aspects of the same process. War
and slave-taking were certainly also involved, as obvious from some of the seals
of high officials. However, warfare did not enter the circuit state-accounting-
writing.15
For a long while, writing was the privilege and task of the priestly elite –
no separate scribal profession was in existence. But writing was not used for
sacred or religious purposes: it was created with the sole purpose to serve
accounting, providing context for numerical and metrological notations (on their
part continuing a much older accounting system based on small tokens of burnt
clay). Circa 85% of all texts from the period are accounts – the remaining 15%
consist of “lexical lists” used for training the script.16
14 Further on, I shall follow the “middle chronology”, which does not exclude anything
between 3400 and 3200.
15 References and documentation for what is said about the period of state formation and
about the third millennium can be found in [Nissen, Damerow & Englund 1993] and
[Høyrup 2009]. The latter publication also provides references and documentation for
the later periods.
16 According to a recent interpretation [Glassner 2013], one historical text seems to have
existed. However, this text is truly the exception that conforms the rule, being an
accounting document, detailing the institution of ceremonial gifts to two (obviously high-
ranking) persons and the attribution of land with appurtenant workers to an institution
(presumably a temple), decided by the assembly of the city in agreement with the decision
of the assembly of the gods; as it shows, no other format than that of the account was
available. What shows the document to be intended and used as a historical record is,
firstly, that it exists in multiple copies; secondly, that it was copied over the following
millennium with additions that identify the two recipients with the culture hero Enmekar,
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The lexical lists are ordered according to categories: trees and wooden objects;
fish; birds; cattle; professions; etc. We may find that natural, we would probably
do as much. However, the investigations of the psychologist Aleksandr Luria
of the structuring of thought, undertaken in the 1930s in Soviet Central Asia,
show otherwise. An illiterate peasant with no experience outside his traditional
life [Luria 1976: 55f, 74f], would think in fixed situations – presented with pictures
of a hammer, a saw, a log and a hatchet he refused to eliminate the log from
the group because it belongs together with the tools applied to it. In his practice,
these objects would go together. Young people who had gone to school and
participated in the construction of the modern world of the kolkhoz or lived
for a while in a larger city – that is, whose experience was not limited to fixed
situations – would think in abstract categories – for example, eliminating the
saucepan from a set consisting of a glass, a pair of spectacles, a bottle and the
saucepan because the three first “are made of glass but the saucepan is metal”.
In this dichotomy, the lexical lists thus represent modernity. But there is
something to add: taken as a whole, they represent their world as a “Cartesian
product” – in one dimension, the various lists, in the other the contents of these;
one list, that of professions, also has the Cartesian product as an internal
condition: in one dimension, the various professions, in the other the ranks
(leader, foreman, worker).
The Cartesian product is also inherent in the accounting tablets. Regularly,
their obverse will carry a number of semantically parallel entries, each of which
list for instance how much various persons have received of different types of
beer; the reverse then shows the totals for the single types, and the grand total.
A few accounting texts can be singled out because their numbers are too
nice or too large, and because they do not carry the seal or signature of a
responsible official – they are model documents, used for teaching. Apart from
these, we have no traces of mathematics teaching. Mesopotamian mathematics
of the protoliterate period, Uruk IV–III, was a an fully integrated tool for
accounting and nothing but. Since distribution of land was accounted for, area
measurement was still part of it, along with metrology and arithmetical
techniques.
The protoliterate statal system collapsed some 300 years after its emergence,
being replaced by a network of competing city states ruled by a military leader
during the Sumerian “Early Dynastic” period. Until c. 2600 BCE we have
supposed inter alia to have been the king of Uruk and the inventor of writing, and his
wife Enmekarzi.
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extremely few written sources, but then writing becomes copious. Around 2550
BCE, we still find the old lexical lists in use in the city state Shuruppak, but now
they serve the training of a genuine scribal profession. We also see writing in wider
use, for instance in the stipulation of private contracts, in the writing of literature
(proverbs) and in “supra-utilitarian” mathematical problems – that is, problems
that according to the matter dealt with seem to concern questions a scribe might
encounter in his working practice, but which would never present themselves
in real life – for instance (a problem that belongs to a later epoch) to determine
the sides of a rectangular field from their sum and its area, or (a problem found
twice in the Shuruppak material) to find the number of workers that could
receive rations of 7 litres of grain from a “storehouse” supposed to contain 2400
tuns, each consisting of 480 litres.17 (The answer probably exceeds the population
of the state.)
Already slightly earlier, the first royal inscriptions turn up; their social
purpose is obvious. However, what was the purpose of putting proverbs – so
far belonging to oral culture – into writing, and what was the purpose of training
mathematical techniques that a working scribe would never have to apply? The
likely answer is scribal self-consciousness or pride. Temple managers could be
proud of belonging to the leading stratum of the city, and had no need to boast
of their ability to use writing and computation, mere subservient tools for their
status. But scribes, no longer priests at the temple, could only glory in being
scribes – and they certainly did, many of the beauteous so-called “school texts”
from Shuruppak seem to be de luxe copies made “in memory of good old school
days” for scribes already well in the career.18
In order to serve scribal self-esteem, mathematics had to be supra-utilitarian
(or utilitarian but particularly difficult). A dentist may be personally proud of
being good at chess; but qua dentist he can only be proud of skills which are,
or at least seem to be, relevant to dentistry or odontology. Some of the empty
corners of the de luxe school texts are filled out by figurative drawings (a deer,
a flower, or the stately teacher). Others carry abstract line patters which modern
mathematicians might view as connected to graph theory; actually, however,
they have the same decorative purpose as the figurative drawings, as shown
by the absence of accompanying text and by their location on the tablet.
17 7 does not divide any of the factors of the metrology, for which reason it would never
be used in real distribution; but for the same reason, it could give rise to “interesting”
mathematical problems.
18 I owe this observation to Aage Westenholtz.
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Shuruppak mathematics remained supra-utilitarian; this means that it always
asks for the correct number – which was after all what a working scribe had to
provide, whether he was engaged in accounting or in surveying (two roles which
were already separate in Shuruppak if not before – the scribe who made a sales
contract for a house appealed to another one, specialist in the matter, to take
the measurements).
Around 2350 BCE, southern Mesopotamia was united, first under a local city
king, very soon however under Sargon of Akkad – Akkad being a so far
unidentified locality in central Iraq. His grandson expanded the realm into a
true empire encompassing the whole of present-day Iraq and much of Syria.
This had consequences for mathematics – common measures (probably to be
applied in transregional administration only) were introduced, and sophisticated
“brick metrologies” meant to facilitate the calculation of manpower needed for
brick constructions were created. Both innovations were obviously linked to the
administrative functions of mathematics. Throughout the Early Dynastic period,
there had also been a constants drive toward “sexagesimalization” – that is, use
of the step factor 60 (the base of the Sumerian number system just as 10 is the
base of our as well as the Roman system) in extensions of existing metrologies
upwards and downwards and as the overall principle of the newly created weight
system. This transformation reflects the partial intellectual autonomy of the
teaching situation – teachers, even teachers supposedly teaching for practice,
tend to know best the practice of teaching, and if they happen to teach mathemat-
ics they will pursue mathematical regularities where such present themselves
(after all, this facilitates teaching). Partial autonomy of teaching and scribal self-
consciousness also shines through in the continued teaching of supra-utilitarian
mathematics – now mostly connected to surveying, for instance the finding of
one side of a rectangular field if the other side is known together with the area
(because of the complexities of the metrology this was no mere division
problem – one may think of an area expressed in acres and a side in yards, feet
and inches).
The Sargonic empire lived no longer than the British world empire, counted
from the battle of Trafalgar to 1945. The 22nd century saw a resurgence of city
states and nomadic incursions, while the 21st century gave rise to a new
centralization of southern Iraq under the “Third Dynasty of Ur”. During its first
30 years, “Ur III” was probably not very different from the Sargonic predecessor,
but in c. 2075 BCE, in the wake of a military reform connected to the establishment
of a genuine empire encompassing central Iraq as well as Elam in the Zagros
area, an administrative reform was introduced. From now on, the larger part
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of the working population at least in the core area was drafted into labour troops
governed by scribal overseers, who were responsible for their produce calculated
according to fixed norms with painstaking precision. As a tool for this accounting,
a place-value system with base 60 was created, and all measures were expressed
as such place-value multiples of “basic units”;19 it was a floating-point system
(that is, in the likeness of a slide rule it was not provided with a “sexagesimal
point” indicating absolute value), and it only served in intermediate calculations.
Mathematically seen, this was an impressive feat, and our own decimal
fractions descend from the Ur III invention. At the same time, it appears that
the mathematical training of future overseer scribes was based exclusively on
model documents: mathematical problems seem to have been banished, as offering
too much space for independent thought.20 In certain ways, this last “renais-
sance” of Sumerian culture (probably already carried by rulers and scribes whose
mother tongue was no longer Sumerian but Akkadian) returned to patterns from
the proto-literate period (though in much larger scale). And whereas mathemat-
ical accounting in the proto-literate period probably gave a lustre of social
“justice” to the corvée and tribute paid in kind to the temples by continuing
systems originally developed in connection with age-old redistributive patterns,
the king who introduced the oppressive administrative reform in 2075 BCE
boasted of its appurtenant metrological reform as an aspect of his “justice” [trans.
Finkelstein 1969: 67].
Common workers apparently did not share his ideas;21 if not falling ill or
dying from starvation they ran away the best they could (all three categories
are accounted for in the texts). This may be one reason that the top-heavy system
collapsed around 2000 BCE. The next 200 years (the first half of the “Old
Babylonian” period) produced a reshuffling of economic structure as well as
scribal and general ideology. Land, even crown land, was leased and thus
19 We may think of expressing classical British monetary units in terms of pence, all
weights in ounces, all lengths in inches, and all areas in square inches. That would reduce
the Sargonic area problem of finding one side of a rectangle from the area and the other
side to a pure division problem.
20 See [Høyrup 2002b]. Not only are problem texts (beyond model documents) totally
absent from the record, which might be an archaeological accident; as can be seen from
the terminology of the subsequent period, the very vocabulary in which to express the
format of problems disappeared and had to be reinvented.
21 A later epic which however reflects the social conditions of Ur III and not those of its
own times relates a wild-cat strike with so much insight in the psychology of such strikes
that it must build on historical experience [ed. trans. Lambert & Millard 1969: 42–55].
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cultivated privately, and also in other respects the economy was individualized.
At the ideological level, the individual also became more visible: the seal became
a token of private identity, not only of office; and private letters (often written
by “street-corner scribes”, a new category) turn up in the record. The scribe
school inculcated an ideology of scribal identity (n a m . l ú . u l ù , meaning
“humanism”!): the scribe should not only be able to write the current Akkadian
language phonetically (even some laymen were able to do so) but also know
all ideographic values of characters – even values so secret that we do not know
what is meant; he should be able to read and speak Sumerian (which only other
scribes would understand); and he should know about mathematics. In the latter
domain, the ideological texts offer no specification, but we may feel confident
that a new, surprisingly high level of supra-utilitarian mathematics falls under
the “humanist” heading.
This supra-utilitarian type of mathematics is what is mostly spoken of as
“Babylonian mathematics” (during the 1760s, Hammurabi of Babylon subdued
the whole of southern and central Iraq, and from then on it is customary to speak
of that region as “Babylonia”). A main component is often referred to as
“Babylonian algebra”; it is actually a technique dealing with square and
rectangular areas and their sides,22 but other questions which we would express
in terms of second-degree algebra can be represented by these geometric entities
and thereby solved.
The starting point was apparently a deliberate attempt to (re-)establish a
culture of mathematical problems in the school. For this purpose, mathematical
riddles were borrowed from non-scribal mathematical practitioners – in particular,
it appears, from Akkadian-speaking surveyors of central Iraq.23 These riddles
were, for instance:
– I have put together the side and the area of a square, and 110 resulted;
– I have torn out the side from the area of a square, and 90 resulted;
– I have put together the four sides and the area of a square, and 140 resulted;
– I have put together the sides of a rectangle, and s resulted, and the area is
A;
– The length of a rectangle exceeds the width by d, and the area is A;
22 Literally, square and rectangular fields and their sides; but the terminology of the texts
distinguish sharply between these “formal” fields and real agricultural plots and their
dimensions.
23 See, for instance, [Høyrup 2011; 2012]. Adoption of oral traditions into the new scribe
school also affected other areas such as divination – see [Richardson 2010].
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– The diagonal of a rectangle is D, and the area is A;
Other riddles dealt with two squares with known sum of or difference between
the sides and known sum of or difference between the areas, and with a circle
for which the sum of perimeter, diameter and area is given. In total, the number
of these riddles will not have exceeded 15.24 In a school which (since the proto-
literate training by means of lexical lists) had always emphasized systematic
variation and learning by heart, however, a small number of riddles would not
serve as a convincing foundation for professional pride. Very soon, therefore,
the adopted riddles gave rise to the creation of a genuine discipline involving
also further experiments (including experiments with problems of the third
degree). We find no traces of theoretical investigation, for instance of conditions
for solvability,25 even though we know texts that aim very clearly at didactical
explanation and concept formation. There are also no problems about geometrical
constructibility of the kind that abounds in Euclid’s Elements. Everything, as in
Shuruppak, asks for the finding of a numerical solution.
Toward the end of the Old Babylonian period we encounter a new phenom-
enon: serialization, that is, collection of sequences of analogous problem
statements first on one tablet, then (that is where the term really applies) on series
of numbered tablets. Similar serializations begin in other areas such as medicine
and divination. Mathematics, however, offers a possibility available only to a
limited extent where the object is not freely constructible: ordering in Cartesian
product. We may look at the sequence #38–53 from the tablet YBC 4668 – see
[Høyrup 2002a: 201–203]. The first problem contains a linear condition that can
be expressed in symbols as
1/19 (L–W)+L = 46
2/3 ,
where L = ( /w ) and W = (
w/ ) w, and w being the sides of a rectangle with
area 600. Here,
– 1/19 (L–W) may be replaced by
1/7 (L+W).
24 The riddles turn up in agrimensor writings from classical Antiquity and the Indian,
Islamic and Latin Middle Ages in ways that exclude descent from the Old Babylonian
school – see [Høyrup 2001]; these later sources allow us to identify them.
25 Since problems were constructed backwards from known solutions, they could not fail
to have one. That, however, is no guarantee that the solution could be found by legitimate
methods – how would one know, for instance, that the dimensions of a rectangle can
be found from its area and the area of another rectangle whose length is the cube on the
original length and whose width is the original diagonal? In order to realize that this
problem is solvable as a cascade of second-degree problem one needs some kind of
theoretical insight – but such insights were apparently never written down.
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– The second member L may be replaced by W.
– The first member may be subtracted instead of added.
– The first member may be taken twice instead of once.
Since the solution is always = 30, w = 20, the number to the right changes
accordingly. In total, this gives 24 different problems.
The Cartesian product, of course, did not pop up from nowhere after having
been forgotten for a millennium. The implicit Cartesian product was known from
the training of the place-value system in the scribe school: here, strictly parallel
multiplication tables for different multiplicands were copied so often that they
had been learned by heart. Only the mathematical series texts, however, allowed
the principle to unfold to the full and in more than two dimensions.
After a protracted economical, political and social crisis, the Old Babylonian
state was destroyed by a Hittite raid in 1595. The raid resulted in general chaos
and eventual takeover of power by Kassite tribes, which had already been present
in the area as hired workers, soldiers and marauders for quite some time. This
led to a general decline of urban life and scribal culture (it has been estimated
that the ratio between town- and countryside dwellers fell to fifth-millennium
levels!). Scholar-scribes were henceforth taught within their family, not in a
school. We know about these families from testimonials coming from the scribal
families of the outgoing second and the earlier first millennium BCE; these
testimonials make it clear that there was some continuation of the tradition but
do not inform about how few people were involved (in any case they will have
been few, and they may have lived from the land owned by the family and not
from scribal services). They kept alive part of what the scribes of the late Old
Babylonian scribes had produced – literature (like the Gilgamesh epic), divination,
and medical texts. From mathematics, however, they only remembered the
metrology shaped in Sargonic and Ur III times and the essentials of the place-
value system. Genuine practical mathematics as needed in trade, taxation and
surveying was probably taken care of by people who had been taught only basic
writing, and who produced new metrologies more intimately linked to agricul-
tural-managerial practice (like areas measured by the seed needed for ploughing
and sowing them); that at least was the situation in the first millennium BCE.
Assurbanipal (668–631 BCE), the last significant ruler of the Assyrian empire
and in his youth an eager pupil of scholar-scribes (originally he had been meant
to become a high priest, not a ruler), boasts that he is able to find reciprocals26
26 Since the Ur-III invention of the place-value system, division by a number n was
- 16 -
and to perform difficult multiplications; in the same text he claims he can read
tablets from “before the Flood” (that is, Early Dynastic texts); his scholar-scribes
at least knew to do it, and even to emulate them. We may conclude that even
the scholar-scribes knew no mathematics beyond multiplication and the division
by means of reciprocals.
In two unconnected episodes, sophisticated supra-utilitarian mathematics
produced by scholar-scribes turns up, once in the fifth century and once in the
third or second century BCE. As can be seen from the terminology, both episodes
draw on material handed down within environments not trained in Sumerian;
it appears that these Late Babylonian scholar-scribes were aware of what had
once, more than a millennium ago, belonged to scribal learning, and tried to
resurrect what had been lost. Once more they drew on the surveyors’ riddles –
but they never developed a discipline from them, nor anything that can be
characterized as an “algebra”. The main text from the latest group also contains
a problem (about a cup produced from two different metals)27 that points
forward to what was to become the grand medieval tradition of practical
arithmetic reaching from India to the Mediterranean.
Summing up
How does this agree with Spengler’s views of mathematics? And with
Spengler’s views of Mesopotamia?
Firstly, it verifies (against Spengler himself) what is said on p. 23:
Wir wissen, daß nur scheinbar eine Wolke um so langsamer wandert, je höher sie
steht und ein Zug durch eine ferne Landschaft nur scheinbar schleicht, aber wir
glauben, daß das Tempo der frühen indischen, babylonischen, ägyptischen Geschichte
wirklich langsamer war als das unsrer jüngsten Vergangenheit. Und wir finden ihre
Substanz dünner, ihre Formen gedämpfter und gestreckter, weil wir nicht gelernt
haben, die – innere und äußere – Entfernung in Rechnung zu stellen.28
performed as a multiplication by the reciprocal 1/n . Assurbanipal thus find it worthwhile
to boast that he is able to use a table of such reciprocals, since that is where they are
found.
27 BM 34568 #16 [Neugebauer 1935: III, 16, 19].
28 “We know quite well that the slowness with which a high cloud or a railway train in
the distance seems to move is only apparent, yet we believe that the tempo of all early
Indian, Babylonian or Egyptian history was really slower than that of our own recent
past. And we think of them as less substantial, more damped-down, more diluted, because
we have not learned to make the allowance for (inward and outward) distances” (p. 17).
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On the basis of what could be read in Eduard Meyer’s Geschichte des Altertums,
Spengler’s main source for what he writes in general about Mesopotamia, it might
perhaps seem reasonable to see this area as carrying one culture culminating and
ending in a phase of civilization. However, the discoveries made during the
intervening century shows this to be an illusion produced by distance. If history
can be fitted into Spengler’s scheme, Ur III may probably be seen as a phase
of civilization, and even as one of Imperialismus. But to include post-Ur-III
Mesopotamia together with (p. 50)
Reiche wie das ägyptische, chinesische, römische, die indische Welt, die Welt des
Islam[, die] noch Jahrhunderte und Jahrtausende stehen bleiben und aus einer
Erobererfaust in die andere gehen können – tote Körper, amorphe, entseelte
Menschenmassen, verbrauchter Stoff einer großen Geschichte29
is misleading. Already Old Babylonian culture, for whose emergence Amorrite
tribal structures were important, is no mere imposition of the conqueror’s fist
on a petrified social body, and the culture of the Assyrian empire is certainly
as much a new culture as was that of the Latin Middle Ages with respect to Greek
Antiquity. Probably as much could be said about China and India, but that is
outside my topic (yet see David Engels’ contribution to the present volume) –
and on the whole, this consideration belongs with a general evaluation of
Spengler’s morphology.
So, let us concentrate on mathematics. Do we find a particular kind of
mathematics, or more modestly a characteristic Mesopotamian mathematical
mind-set?
To some extent we do – or at least we are easily led to believe so from our
particular stance. We find no formulation of theorems and no explicit demon-
strations. But perhaps it is the Euclidean type that is an exception. The Egyptian
Rhind Mathematical Papyrus [ed. trans. Peet 1923] also teaches to find the correct
number; so do the Chinese Nine Chapters on Arithmetic [ed. trans. Chemla & Guo
2003]; and so did my own middle school arithmetic in the 1950s (etc.). This
interest in finding the correct number follows from the purpose of the teaching –
namely to train for work where finding the correct number is essential. In all
three cases we find supra-utilitarian problems that also ask for a numerical
solution; that is a consequence of the dynamics of the school situation.
29 “the Egyptian empire, the Roman, the Chinese, the Indian[, which] may continue to
exist for hundreds or thousands of years 〈and be taken over from one conqueror’s fist
by another one〉 – dead bodies, amorphous and dispirited masses of men, scrap-material
from a great history” (p. 36).
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If we scrutinize the Old Babylonian “algebraic” technique in depth we shall
also find an organization of mathematical thought so different from ours that
for long it was only interpreted in term of modern equation algebra, which could
show why results were correct and make sense of the numbers occurring in the
texts but could not account for their words.30 But this was not characteristic
of the long run of Mesopotamian mathematical culture but only in existence for
a couple of centuries. At a pinch we could link it to the field plans we know
from Ur III, which would give us half a millennium at least – but then we end
up seeing it as a supra-utilitarian outgrowth and expression of pre-modern
agrimensorial mathematical thought in general, always based on partition into
rectangles and right-angled triangles.
The repeated appearance of the Cartesian product is a more significant
characteristic, long-lasting and specifically Mesopotamian (even though it has
affected later cultures through their direct or indirect familiarity with Seleucid
astronomical tables). Of course this does not in itself suggests a unique
Zahlenwelt/“number-world”, and it hardly expresses a particular Weltgefühl/
“world-feeling”; but at least it connects the mathematical thinking of scribes to
other aspects of scribal training in a rather specific way and to the roots of
Mesopotamian mathematics in bureaucratic accounting.
This leads to what is probably the most serious objection to/revision of
Spengler’s postulated separate mathematical universes: mathematical thought
is not carried by a general “culture” as expressed by its “Bauerntum (und dessen
höchste Form, der Landadel” (“the countryman and especially that highest form
of countryman, the country gentleman” – p. 44, translation p. 32); it was always
a matter for specialists (Wells and Toynbee were neither the first nor the last
to leave mathematics to these). Mathematical practitioners, moreover, participate
in cultures of their own that often intersect with several “cultures” defined by
mythology and priesthood instead of being contained within one of them – not
to speak about coinciding. They were, for instance, travelling merchants – military
engineers and tax officials following the conquerors or selling their services to
them (sometimes conquered as booty themselves) – and master builders hired
by whoever needed them and could pay. That is not only a difficulty if we try
to apply Spengler’s ideas to Mesopotamian mathematics – it is no accident that
what he has to say about Greek mathematics and its Weltgefühl fits sculpture
and the opinions of Platonizing and Neopythagorean philosophers like Plutarch
30 See [Høyrup 2013], Introduction and Chapter 5.
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and Iamblichos31 much better than Aristotle, not to speak of Euclid, Archimedes
and Apollonios, and that Hypsicles and other mathematicians based in Alexandria
have to be written off as “zweifellos sämtlich Aramäer”/“all without doubts
Aramaeans”, carriers of Syrian thought and “Widerschein früharabischer
Innerlichkeit”/“early Arabic Inwardness” (p. 86 and II, p. 240f, quotations pp.
86 and II, p. 241, translated pp. 63 and II, 200).
All in all, Spengler’s Romanticist essentialism with its belief in over-arching
“cultures” becomes a deforming straitjacket when applied to the history of
mathematics; but Spengler’s insistence that mathematics are plural, and not only
in the etymological sense that mathematics encompasses a plurality of disciplines,
remains a fundamental insight and corrective, not least to still prevailing, equally
essentialist “mathematicians’ historiography of mathematics”.
At least when it comes to mathematics, the teaching of Der Untergang is, like
positivist scepticism, a medicine – the latter against theoretical drunkenness, the
former against unidimensional teleological simplification of its history.
Medicine is not food, and nobody can live from medicine alone. But medicine
may still be needed.
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